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Antitrust Issues in an International
Dimension
C.D. Ehlermannt
We live in an amazing time. The walls separating the East
from the West have come tumbling down with astonishing speed in
a way no one would have dared to prophesy some years ago. De-
mocracy and liberalism seem to be carrying the day with unprece-
dented success. At the same time, the role of competition policy in
the international economy is ever increasing, just as the antitrust
enforcement activities of our major partners are becoming more
and more internationalized.
These two developments are, of course, as former Assistant
Attorney General James Rill has aptly expressed, two sides of the
same coin.' As a consequence of the growing integration of world
markets, antitrust enforcement covers not only the "national"
players, but also necessarily extends to foreign companies con-
ducting business in the relevant home market of an antitrust
agency. More frequently than ever, agreements between economic
entities cover more than one territory and, thus, fall under several
jurisdictions.
These developments parallel a growing conviction among gov-
ernments that a serious competition policy is needed, both on a
national and world level. This conviction, which the European
Community ("EC" or "Community") shares with its major trading
partners, is winning more adherents than ever. The new democra-
cies in Eastern and Central Europe have already come to realize
that competition policy, as practiced in the Western world, is one
of the crucial issues they must address if they are to build viable
and open economies. Similarly, within the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development ("UNCTAD"), or even within the
t Director General For Competition, Commission of the European Communities. This
is a revised and updated version of a lecture delivered in Chicago on January 30, 1992. All
views expressed are purely personal. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Thinam Jakob-Siebert and Hartmut Weyer.
I James F. Rill, International Antitrust Policy - A Justice Department Perspective 3
(Before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Program on EC and US Competition Law,
Oct 24, 1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Chicago Legal Forum).
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context of bilateral agreements, more and more developing coun-
tries are requesting technical assistance in setting up their own an-
titrust legislation and enforcement regimes. We, the members of
the European Community and the United States, must welcome
these developments and should employ our best efforts to meet the
challenge that they bring.
As we work to meet this goal, we should aim to establish anti-
trust rules at the world level. Certainly, in an open world market,
we need to have a common conviction about certain minimum
standards for controlling cartels, dominant positions, and mergers.
We should not allow the state restraints we have abolished to be
replaced by private restraints, for they would directly counteract
the liberalization of trade. However, at least at present, we have to
act without a uniform world antitrust law. The European Commu-
nity and the United States, for instance, have rules which are
based upon approaches which differ slightly at times, and yet, we
are cooperating in a very satisfactory manner.
This paper will illustrate the Community approach by describ-
ing three recent examples in which the EC has actively promoted
cooperative competition policy. The first example is the agreement
on the European Economic Area ("EEA") which the Community
recently signed with the seven European Free Trade Association
("EFTA") States: Sweden, Norway, Finland, Iceland, Switzerland,
Austria, and Liechtenstein. The second example is the recent Eu-
ropean Agreements concluded by the Community with Hungary,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia. The third and final example is the co-
operation agreement between the EC Commission and the U.S.
federal antitrust authorities. Together, these examples demon-
strate how individual circumstances determine whether or not the
rules should be exactly the same.
I. THE EC-EFTA AGREEMENT
The EC-EFTA Agreement on the creation of the EEA is a
novelty in the field of international relations. The EEA seeks to
create an enlarged European market. Within the EEA, free move-
ment of goods and services, workers and capital, as well as the
right of establishment, will follow the same principles as those
valid within the European Community to the largest extent possi-
ble. The EFTA States have associated themselves as closely as pos-
sible with new Community initiatives. The rules established in the
context of the EEA Agreement are intended to have "direct ef-
fect," meaning that individuals and companies may invoke them
before the national courts of the Contracting Parties. For instance,
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parties may claim damages on the grounds that a given contract is
null because it contravenes the EEA rules on competition.
A. The Origins of the European Economic Area Agreement
The EEA is an extension of a series of Association Agreements
concluded by the EC with so-called "third countries" (states other
than members of the European Community). These earlier agree-
ments provide the legal background for the EEA, and help to ex-
plain the economic and political factors leading to its adoption.
1. EC Association Agreements.
As early as 1961 and 1963, the Community concluded Associa-
tion Agreements with Greece2 and Turkey, s which came into force
in 1963 and 1964, respectively. These Agreements were designed to
facilitate the future accession of these countries to the EC. On Jan-
uary 1, 1981, Greece became the tenth EC Member State, termi-
nating the application of the Greek Association Agreement. The
Agreement with Turkey entered into a transitional phase in 1973.4
Presumably, this transition will lead to the final phase encompass-
ing a customs union and closer coordination of economic policies.5
In 1987, Turkey applied for EC membership.
These types of association agreements 6 go far beyond customs
unions, covering the free movement of goods, services, and persons,
the transfer of payments, competition, and taxes, as well as eco-
nomic policy. Regarding competition policy in particular, the
Agreements state that the principles expressed in EEC Treaty
competition provisions-the Treaty articles governing cartels and
concerted practices, the abuse of a dominant position,8 the role of
public undertakings,9 and state aids10-must be applicable within
the Association. The Agreements charge an Association Council
with establishing the conditions and details of application within a
Decision du Conseil portant conclusion de l'accord cr~ant une association entre la
Communaut6 6conomique europ6enne et la Gr6ce, 63/106, 1963 JO 26:293.
- D6cision du Conseil portant conclusion de l'accord cr6ant une association entre la
Communaut6 6conomique europ6enne et la Turquie, 64/732, 1964 JO 217:3685.
R6glement (CEE) 2760/72 du Conseil, 1972 JO L293:1.
Association Agreement, Arts 2 and 5, 1964 JO 217:3685, 3689.
6 In the case of Turkey and the Supplementary Protocol of 1973, see 1972 JO L293:1.
7 Treaty Est the Eur Eco Comm, Art 85.
* EEC, Art 86.
9 EEC, Art 90.
,0 EEC, Art 92.
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given time limit,11 which in the case of Turkey expired December
31, 1978.
The European Court of Justice ("ECJ") confirmed that these
Association Agreements form an integral part of the Community
legal system and therefore are binding on the Community and its
Member States and open to judicial control before the ECJ.12 The
ECJ also has recognized that stipulations of the Association Agree-
ments-can have direct effect,13 unless the obligation, in its imple-
mentation or effects, requires the adoption of any subsequent mea-
sure, especially by an Association Council.1 4 Accordingly, the
competition rules most likely do not have direct effect. In the As-
sociation Agreement with Turkey, for example, the competition
rules are subject to measures which have not yet been adopted. 15
Moreover, the obligation of the Association Council to lay down
conditions and details for the application of the competition rules
suggests that the rules are not sufficiently precise and uncondi-
tional to have direct effect. 6
2. EC Free Trade Agreements.
Competition rules were also included among provisions in the
bilateral Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") concluded by the EC in
the early 1970s with the seven EFTA1 7 States (namely, Austria, 8
Association Agreement EC-Greece, 1963 JO 26:293, Arts 51, 52; Association Agree-
ment EC-Turkey, 1964 JO 217:3685, 3691, Art 16; Supplementary Protocol, 1972 JO L293:1,
14, Art 43.
i" Case 181/73, R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian State, 1974 ECR 449, 460, 1975:1 CMLR
515 (concerning the Agreement EC-Greece); Case 12/86, Demirel v Stadt Schwabisch
Gmund, 1987 ECR 3719, 3750, 1989:1 CMLR 421 (concerning the Agreement EC-Turkey).
"3 Case 17/81, Pabst & Richarz KG v Hauptzollamt Oldenburg, 1982 ECR 1331, 1350,
1983:3 CMLR 11 (concerning a provision about fiscal non-discrimination in the Agreement
EC-Greece).
14 Case 12/86, Demirel, 1987 ECR at 3753 (concerning a provision about the free move-
ment of workers in the Agreement EC-Turkey).
" The inactivity of the Association Council is at least partly due to political and eco-
nomic difficulties. After the rise to power of a military regime in Turkey in 1981, there were
no high-level meetings of the Association Council until 1986. Other difficulties originated in
the Greek position towards Turkey.
" See Case C-18/90, Office Nationale de l'Emploi v Kziber, judgment of 31 January
1991 (not yet reported) (concerning Arts 41, 42 of the Association Agreement with Morocco,
1978 OJ L264:1, 20).
'7 European Free Trade Association, founded by the Stockholm Convention of Jan 4,
1960.
18 Regulation (EEC) No 2836/72 of the Council concluding an Agreement between .the
European Economic Community and the Republic of Austria, 1972 JO L300:1.
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Finland,1 9 Iceland,20 Norway, 1 Portugal, Sweden, 3 and Switzer-
land/Liechtenstein2 4 ). In contrast to the Association Agreements
with Greece and Turkey, the FTAs did not aim at future member-
ship. Instead, they were born of a need for economic cooperation
with the EC, while acknowledging the difficulty for the EFTA
States if they associate themselves too closely with the Commu-
nity's aims toward dynamic integration. 5 The legal basis in the
EEC Treaty for the proposed creation of free trade areas was
therefore Article 113 instead of Article 238, because the latter
would have required at least partial participation of the associated
country in the system of the Community.
2'
The FTAs explicitly refer to the broad framework of interna-
tional trade and expressly state that the aim of the Agreements is
"to contribute . . ., by the removal of barriers to trade, to the har-
monious development and expansion of world trade. '27 Thus, one
main objective of the Agreements is "to provide fair conditions of
competition for trade between the Contracting Parties."2 8 This ob-
jective is based on the increasingly popular assessment that a lack
of a common understanding on these issues "would entail serious
risks of distortion of competition liable to jeopardize the harmoni-
ous expansion of trade."2 9
Regulation (EEC) No 3177/73 of the Council concluding the Agreement between the
European Economic Community and the Republic of Finland, 1973 JO L328:1.
1 20 Regulation (EEC) No 2842/72 of the Council concluding an Agreement between the
European Economic Community and the Republic of Iceland, 1972 JO L301:1.
" Regulation (EEC) No 1691/73 of the Council concluding an Agreement between the
European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Norway, 1973 JO L171:1.
22 Regulation (EEC) No 2844/72 of the Council concluding an Agreement between the
European Economic Community and the Portuguese Republic, 1972 JO L301:164, Special
edition 1972.
23 Regulation (EEC) No 2838/72 of the Council concluding an Agreement between the
European Economic Community and the Kingdom of Sweden, 1972 JO L300:96, Special
edition 1972.
" Regulation (EEC) No 2840/72 of the Council concluding an Agreement between the
European Economic Community and the Suiss Confederation and adopting provisions for
its implementation and concluding an additional Agreement concerriing the validity, for the
Principality of Liechtenstein, of the Agreement between the European Economic Commu-
nity and the Swiss Confederation, 1972 JO L300:188, Special edition 1974; a similar Agree-
ment was also concluded with Israel, 1975 JO L136:1.
" The Agreements with Austria and Finland omitted even the allusion in the introduc-
tory paragraphs to the "purpose of contributing to the work of constructing Europe," con-
tained in the other Agreements. See 1972 JO L300:1; 1973 JO L328:1.
20 Case 12/86, Demirel, 1987 ECR at 3751.
27 Free Trade Agreements, Art 1(c) (cited in notes 18 - 24).
28 Free Trade Agreements, Art 1(b) (cited in notes 18 - 24).
2" EC Commission, Second Report on Competition Policy 17 (1972); EC Commission,
Sixth General Report on the Activities of the Communities 30.
241]
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Therefore, Article 23 of the Agreements ° provides that cartels
and concerted practices, abuses of dominant positions, and public
aids are incompatible with the proper functioning of the Agree-
ments insofar as they may affect trade between the Contracting
Parties. If one of the Contracting Parties considers a given practice
to be incompatible with these rules, it may take appropriate mea-
sures in accordance with the conditions and procedures set forth in
Article 27 of the FTAs,31 which require, in particular, consultation
between the Contracting Parties in the respective Joint Commit-
tees. Consultation is being used for the first time in a case involv-
ing public aid from Austrian authorities to Eurostar, a joint ven-
ture of Chrysler and Steyr-Daimler-Puch, for the establishment of
a manufacturing plant in Graz.2 No consensus has been reached in
the Joint Committee, and thus, the EC might unilaterally apply
import duties in accordance with Article 27 of the FTA.
The rules and procedures provided for in the FTAs, however,
do not preclude the application of the competition rules of the
EEC Treaty if a given practice is incompatible with an FTA and
the EEC Treaty at the same time.3 3 While reliance on the provi-
sions of the FTAs is often unnecessary, the FTA offers- the only
legal basis for action in dealing with public aids and cartels that do
not fall within the scope of the EEC Treaty. The Community has
declared that it will evaluate practices under Article 23(1) of the
FTAs on the basis of the criteria applied to the EEC Treaty's com-
petition provisions. 4
A matter of intense debate concerns the direct effect of the
FTAs' competition rules.3 5 In the beginning, the Commission ex-
Agreement EC-Iceland, Art 24(1), 1972 JO L301:6.
31 Id, Art 28, 1972 JO at L301:7.
32 See Chrysler, Austrian Firm Plan Minivans, Detroit News 1E (Jan 23, 1990); Erich
Th~ni and Meinhard Ciresa, Der Fall Chrysler, Economy-Fachmagazin 13 (Oct 1990); A
Borderless Europe, Auto Week 10 (June 18, 1990); John Griffiths, Chrysler Plans Russian
Network, World Trade News § 1 at 4 (Sept 12, 1992). The plant was inaugurated on April
29, 1992.
" See the famous "Woodpulp" case (regarding the EC's FTA with Finland), Joint
Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85, 4hlstrom Osakeyhtib v
Commission, 1988 ECR 5193, 5246, 1988:4 CMLR 901. For comment on this point, see J.E.
Ferry, Towards Completing the Charm: The Woodpulp Judgment, 10 European Competi-
tion L Rev 58, 70-71 (1989), and Laurence Idot, 1989 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Europeen
341, 353-354 (1989). See also Commission Dec 85/202 (Woodpulp), 1985 OJ L85:1; Commis-
sion Dec 86/398/EEC (Polypropylene), 1986 OJ L230:1; Commission Dec 89/190/EEC
(PVC), 1989 OJ L74:1; and Commission Dec 89/191/EEC (LdPE), 1989 OJ L74:21.
For example, the Agreement with Austria, 1972 JO L300:92.
" This debate does not include those rules governing public aids, for which a direct
effect has not been discussed.
[1992:
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pressed the view that the inclusion of competition rules compara-
ble, in substance, to those of the EEC Treaty did not mean they
had direct effect. The Commission argued that the FTAs contained
a special provision governing their enforcement under Article 27.36
The ECJ has not pronounced its judgment on this question.
The ECJ's recognition that the stipulations prohibiting fiscal dis-
crimination 37 and, implicitly, measures equivalent to quantitative
restrictions,38 have direct effect proves only that the direct effect of
stipulations in the FTAs cannot generally be denied. Unlike Article
23(2) of the FTA, however, those provisions do not refer to any
special enforcement procedure. Moreover, in dealing with cartels
and concerted practices, the FTAs do not contain an exemption
procedure comparable to Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty. The
Treaty would therefore have to be included by way of interpreta-
tion if the provisions were to have direct effect. Together, these
considerations suggest that the competition rules, viewed in light
of the purpose and the context of the Agreements, lack sufficient
precision and unconditionality to have direct effect."9 The absence
of any executing provisions on the side of the Community
strengthens this conclusion.40
36 Commission, Second Report on Competition Policy 17 (1972).
11 Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz v Kupferberg, 1982 ECR 3641, 3661-66, 1983:1
CMLR 1 (concerning Art 21(1) of the Agreement with Portugal).
" Case 65/69, Procureur de la R~publique v Chatain, 1980 ECR 1345, 1384-87, 1981:3
CMLR 418 (concerning Art 13 of the Agreement with Switzerland). In the famous Polydor
case, concerning a different aspect of the equivalent provision in the Agreement with Portu-
gal, the ECJ explicitly left open the question of direct effect. Case 270/80, Polydor Ltd. v
Harlequin Record Shops Ltd., 1982 ECR 329, 350-1, 1982:1 CMLR 677.
19 Such is the formula of the ECJ. See, for example, Case 104/81, Hauptzollamt Mainz,
1982 ECR 3641, 3665. Commentators are divided on the question of whether the competi-
tion rules have direct effect. For arguments that the competition rules do have direct effect,
see Neville March Hunnings, Enforceability of the EC-EFTA Free Trade Agreements, 1977
European L Rev 163, 188; Neville March Hunnings, Enforceability, A Rejoinder, 1978 Euro-
pean L Rev 278; and Helmut Schr6ter, in Hans von der Groeben, Jochen T. Thiesing, and
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, eds, Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag 1381-83 (Nomos, 4th ed,
1991), Vorbemerkung Art 85-89, pt 123-24.
For arguments that they do not, see M. Waelbroeck, Enforceability of the EC-EFTA
Free Trade Agreements: A Reply, 1978 European L Rev 27, 29-31; Winfried Veelken, Die
unmittelbare Anwendbarkeit der Freihandelsvertrage der EG mit den sog. Rest-Efta-
Staaten, 34 Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft 112, 121 (1988). Notably, the Swiss Fed-
eral Supreme Court has held that such competition rules do not have direct effect. Adams v
Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Basel-Stadt, 1978:3 CMLR 480, 485-86 (regarding Art
23(1) of the Agreement EC-Switzerland).
"0 Ulf Bernitz, The EC-EFTA Free Trade Agreements with Special Reference to the
Position of Sweden and the Other Scandinavian EFTA Countries, 23 Common.Mkt L Rev
567, 587 (1986); Ernst-Joachim Mestmticker, Die Gewahrleistung gerechter Wettbewerb-
sbedingungen in den Freihandelsabkommen der EG, in Festschrift fi~r Zweigert 681, 690
(Mohr, 1981).
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Yet, the FTAs have at least an indirect effect on the assess-
ment of certain anticompetitive practices in the relations between
the Community and EFTA States. Before the abolition of taxes
provided for in the FTAs, the effect within the EC of vertical ar-
rangements restricting trade with third countries was not consid-
ered appreciable. Tax barriers made the reimportation of goods
into the EC, and thus effects on the Community territory, highly
improbable."1 After the full realization of free trade areas with the
EFTA countries (limited however to goods and not covering ser-
vices), such arrangements, depending on the individual circum-
stances, may fall within the scope of Article 85(1) of the EEC
Treaty.42 Thus, an action may be brought not only by the Commis-
sion, but also by individuals and companies before the national
courts of EC Member States.
3. The European Economic Area Agreement.
At a joint ministerial meeting in 1984, the EC and EFTA initi-
ated the so-called Luxembourg process to strengthen the economic
cooperation begun under the then-existing Free Trade Agree-
ments.43 This process, and the economic pressures toward greater
integration, ultimately led to the signing of the EEA Agreement.
As mentioned above, the EFTA was founded as a counterpart
to the EC, as a model of intergovernmental cooperation rather
than dynamic integration. Nevertheless, the EC was apparently the
more attractive of the two systems, due to some extent to the legal
framework it provides for economic activities. Portugal became a
member in 1986 (together with Spain, which was not an EFTA
country). Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and Norway have
applied for membership, and other EFTA countries are consider-
ing accession as well.
This attractive force increased with the Community's 1992 in-
ternal market program.44 Although a Common Market should have
been established at the latest in 1970, certain obstacles to internal
trade remained. To remove these obstacles, the Community de-
cided to launch the program for the completion of the common
market, now called the internal market, by the end of 1992. This
4 Commission Dec 76/159 (Saba), 1976 OJ L28:19, 22, 26; Commission Dec 77/100
(Junghans), 1977 OJ L30:10, 14.
Commission Dec 77/100 (Junghans), 1977 OJ at L30:14.
"8 The text of the Joint Ministerial Declaration is reproduced in 4 Bull EEC pt 1.2.1
(1984).
" White Paper. on the Completion of the Internal Market (1985) (Office of Publica-
tions of the European Communities, Catalogue no CB 43-85-894-DE-C).
[1992:
ANTITRUST ISSUES
program was made part of the EC's "constitution" in the frame-
work of the 1986/87 Single European Act.45 The new dynamics of
the integration process were not to remain without influence on
other parts of Europe: On January 17, 1989, Jacques Delors, Presi-
dent of the EC Commission, outlined a plan for a pan-European
strategy before the European Parliament.46 EFTA ministers wel-
comed this initiative in Oslo on March 15, 1989, and declared: "We
envisage that negotiations would lead to the fullest possible real-
isation of free movement of goods, services, capital, and persons
with the aim of creating a dynamic and homogeneous European
Economic Space. 41
After a phase of exploratory discussions, formal negotiations
began in June 1990, and political agreement was reached in Octo-
ber 1991.48 However, on December 14, 1991, the European Court of
Justice concluded that the EEA Agreement was incompatible with
EC law.49 As a result, discussions were reopened to a certain ex-
tent,5 0 and the Agreement was not signed until May 2, 1992, after
the ECJ delivered its second opinion on April 10, 1992.1
B. The Contents of the EEA Agreement
1. Substance.
The aim of the negotiations was to create, as of January 1,
1993, a European area which would resemble an internal market as
closely as possible and within which the Community's "four free-
doms" (right of free movement of goods, services, persons, and
capital) would be realized to the greatest possible extent. Both
sides quickly agreed that this should be done on the basis of the
acquis communautaire, the substantive Community rules as ap-
plied and interpreted by Community organs, particularly the
ECJ. 2 Thus, the current EEA Agreement contains rules broadly
identical to Community provisions.5
" Single European Act ("SEA"), 1987 OJ L169:1.
" 1 Bull EEC pts 1.1.1.-1.1.5. (1989); Bull EEC (Supp 1/89).
17 3 Bull EEC pt 2.2.7 (1989).
48 Compare the summary of negotiations in the Commission, XXIIIrd General Report
on the Activities of the Communities (1989), starting at pt 780; Commission, XXIVth Gen-
eral Report on the Activities of the Communities (1990), pt 688; and Commission XXVth
General Report on the Activities of the Communities (1991), starting at pt 846.
49 Opinion 1/91 (ECJ, Dec 14, 1991), 1992 OJ Cl10.
50 See Commission Press Release IP(91)1149 (Dec 15, 1991).
" Opinion 1/92 (ECJ, Apr 10, 1992), 1992 OJ C136.
"' See Joint EC-EFTA Ministerial Declaration (Dec 19, 1989), 12 Bull EEC (1989).
13 See, for example, Agence Europe of Oct 23, 1991. Numbers of Articles or Protocols as
contained in the draft EEA Agreement will not be cited in this text.
241]
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The free movement of goods-already to a large extent a fact
of business life since 1972-will be further facilitated by EFTA
recognition of EC standards as well as by the application of other
relevant Community rules. Nevertheless, "internal" border con-
trols will continue to exist as there will be no common customs
tariff and no tax harmonization efforts.
Services will be liberalized, particularly banking and insur-
ance, telecommunications, and certain public sector services, in-
cluding water and energy."' The free movement of workers, com-
prising movement of persons and the right to establishment, will
have to be realized within a transition period of five years for Swit-
zerland and Liechtenstein. After that, discrimination against na-
tionals of Contracting Parties will be, in principle, prohibited. Cap-
ital movement will be liberalized as well, although initially a
number of transition periods will apply to both cross-border in-
vestments in companies and the acquisition of land ownership.
In addition to adopting Community rules in the areas of the
four freedoms, the EFTA countries will participate in, and contrib-
ute to, a number of programs, called "flanking policies." These pol-
icies support research and development, education, environmental
protection, consumer policy, social policy, and economic and social
cohesion. Economic and social cohesion will be implemented
through the creation of a cohesion fund, established to benefit cer-
tain poorer EC Member States (specifically Ireland, Portugal,
Greece, and Spain).
The EEA also contains provisions guiding future cooperation.
So-called "evolutionary clauses" have been agreed upon, enabling
Contracting Parties to discuss regularly progress achieved in cer-
tain areas, such as rules of origin or fisheries. In cases of serious
difficulties, a Contracting Party may unilaterally-usually after
consultation with the other Contracting Parties-limit the free-
doms granted under the EEA regime. If such unilateral action
leads to a disequilibrium in the contractual relations, the other
Contracting Parties may take appropriate "rebalancing" measures.
As with the rules regarding the four freedoms, the negotiators
agreed that the Community rules on competition would be incor-
porated into the EEA Agreement and applied by the EFTA na-
tions. These rules cover not only cartels55 and abuses of domi-
Transportation posed delicate problems. However, these problems have been re-
solved through separate agreements with Austria and Switzerland.
"5 EEC, Art 85.
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nance,5 but also state monopolies,57 enterprises enjoying special or
exclusive rights,58 and the control of state aids,59 as well as the cor-
responding provisions of the Paris Treaty creating the European
Coal and Steel Community ("ECSC").
The draft EEA agreement foresees a complex system designed
to ensure, as far as possible, equal conditions of competition
throughout the EEA. From the beginning of the negotiations, one
of the Community's main concerns was ensuring a level playing
field for all participants. In an almost entirely open market, it
would never do to have a paradise for cartels on one side of the
territory and a strict policy against them on the other. Not only
would this counter consumers' interests, but it would also contra-
dict the aims pursued in the EEA negotiations, namely, free trade
and integrated markets. The abolition of governmental restraints
does not suffice to ensure market access if they are replaced by
private restraints. Moreover, state aids and preferential treatment
of public companies may distort competition and create additional
barriers to market access. The EFTA States shared these concerns
to a large extent, which is why one of the key issues in the course
of the negotiations was how to ensure such equal conditions of
competition throughout the EEA.6 °
2. Institutional framework.
The institutional aspect was certainly the most difficult part of
the negotiations.6 1 Both sides predicted that new measures and de-
velopments might disturb the desired homogeneity of the new sys-
tem. Consequently, certain EFTA States favored truly common de-
cision-making mechanisms, that is, a sort of "superstructure." The
Community, however, could not accept such a structure for consti-
tutional reasons and desired to keep intact its "decision-making
autonomy." The Community and EFTA were able to reach a com-
06 EEC, Art 86.
5 EEC, Art 37.
11 EEC, Art 90.
0 EEC, Art 92.
60 For a recent survey of EEA competition rules, see Claude Rouam, L'Espace
economique europen: Un horizon nouveau pour la politique de concurrence?, 354 Revue
du March6 Commun 53 (Jan 1992); Thinam Jakob-Siebert, Der Europiische Wirtschaft-
sraum: Wettbewerbspolitik in einer neuen Dimension, 6 Wirtschaftsrechtliche Blatter 118
(1992).
" For general reflections on institutional issues, see Daniel ThuIrer, Auf dem Wege zu
einem Europaischen Wirtschaftsraum?, Schweizerische Juristen-Zeitung 93 (Mar 15, 1990);
Horst Gunter Krenzler, Neugestaltung der Beziehungen der EG zu den EFTA-Staaten,
Europ~iische Zeitung (Dec 14, 1989).
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promise. The EFTA side will be associated, by way of complex
procedures, to the Community's "decision-shaping" phase, the pre-
paratory phase before any formalized measures are taken. Once an
EC law has been adopted, it can be'extended by consensus of the
Contracting Parties to the EEA.
This approach had been denominated by the "two pillars" ap-
proach. Even though there are 20 Contracting Parties to the EEA
(the Community, her twelve Member States, and the seven EFTA
countries), the parties have agreed that the Community side and
the EFTA side will each speak with one voice. This approach can
be seen, in particular, in the provisions setting up two of the EEA
institutions, namely, the EEA Council and the EEA Joint Commit-
tee. The former will be responsible for giving the political impetus
to implement the EEA Agreement, as well as for handling issues
giving rise to difficulties among Contracting Parties. The latter will
be charged with the day-to-day implementation of the Agreement.
Additional institutions of the Agreement, each serving a con-
sultative function, will be a Joint Parliamentary Committee, com-
posed of members of the European Parliament and the parlia-
ments of EFTA States and an EEA Consultative Committee,
composed of members of the EC Economic and Social Committee
and the EFTA Consultative Committee, which will represent the
social partners.
The EFTA States will further create structures corresponding
to Community structures-strengthening the two-pillar approach.
One, the EFTA Consultative Committee, has already been men-
tioned. Another, a Standing Committee, will have decisionmaking,
administrative, and management functions, and will institutional-
ize consultations among EFTA States. Thus, the Standing Com-
mittee's responsibilities will be very much like those of the EC
Council. A third structure, an independent EFTA Surveillance Au-
thority, will assume certain tasks corresponding to those'of the EC
Commission, namely, monitoring EFTA States' fulfillment of obli-
gations under the EEA Agreement. This Authority will have spe-
cific responsibilities in the field of competition, and will be en-
trusted with the same procedural powers as the EC Commission to
investigate and impose fines.62
The draft EEA Agreement further anticipated the creation of
an independent EEA Court and an EEA Court of First Instance.
62 There will thus be a "Regulation No 17 bis" on the EFTA side. Compare with the
executive powers of the EC, as provided in Commission Reg 17/62, 1962 JO 62:204. Fines
may be imposed on companies amounting up to 10% of their annual turnover.
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These courts, functionally integrated with the European Court of
Justice in Luxembourg, would have been composed of both ECJ
and EFTA judges. The EEA courts would have had jurisdiction to
settle disputes among Contracting Parties resulting from the appli-
cation of the EEA Agreement, as well as jurisdiction to decide on
complaints of individuals against acts of the EFTA Surveillance
Authority in the competition field.
The ECJ, however, opposed the provisions creating these addi-
tional courts.63 The ECJ, whose views had been sought by the EC
Commission as to whether the EEA Agreement, in particular the
provisions regarding the powers of the EEA courts, was compatible
with the EEC Treaty, delivered a negative opinion on December
14, 1991. The ECJ held that such a system was incompatible with
basic principles of EC law, noting that, according to Article 164 of
the EEC Treaty, the sole power to interpret Community acts lies
with the European Court of Justice. Under the draft EEA Agree-
ment, however, the EEA Courts would also have been empowered
to interpret rules identical to EC rules to the extent they were in-
corporated in the EEA Agreement, and thus, the EEA courts
would, at least indirectly, have been put in the position of inter-
preting EC rules. The ECJ concluded that this arrangement would
put into question the basic system of the Community and, there-
fore, could not be tolerated.
Reactions to this opinion were-obviously-mixed; however
the Community and EFTA States agreed to reopen discussions in
order to address the ECJ's objections." These discussions were ter-
minated in February 1992, and the ECJ's opinion on the recently
negotiated texts was sought anew. This time, the ECJ declared the
EEA Agreement to be compatible with the EEC Treaty since, in
particular, the notion of a common court had been abandoned and
since dispute settlement between the Contracting Parties will take
place mainly in the political framework of the Joint Committee,
with an EFTA court responsible for "internal" EFTA disputes. 5
3. The specific institutional framework for competition.
As mentioned above, the Community rules on competition are
incorporated into the EEA Agreement and will be applied on the
EFTA side by the new EFTA Surveillance Authority. Here is per-
haps the most striking illustration of the two-pillar approach
"3 See Opinion 1/91 (ECJ, Dec 14, 1991), 1992 OJ Clio.
6 For a first reaction, see EC Commission Press Release IP/91/1149 (Dec 15, 1991).
" Opinion 1/92 (ECJ, Apr 10, 1992), 1992 OJ C136.
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within the EEA context: the same substantive competition rules
will be applied by two independent organs (the EC Commission
and the EFTA Surveillance Authority).
Tracing the evolution of the EEA competition system through
the course of the negotiations, a number of different proposals for
ensuring equal conditions of competition were placed on the table
at different stages of the negotiations. These proposals basically
fell into three categories: 1) leave things as they were and reinforce
the cooperation structures under the existing bilateral Free Trade
Agreements with the EFTA States; 2) create uniform rules to be
enforced throughout the EEA by one single authority; and 3) de-
sign a "two-pillar" model, by which the same substantive rules
would be applied by the EC Commission as well as by an indepen-
dent EFTA authority.
The parties rejected the first concept, which would not have
led to the desired goal of equal conditions of competition. The
Community's antitrust system is based on the prohibition princi-
ple, whereby restrictive arrangements are automatically null and
void, unless the Commission grants an express derogation." By
contrast, the laws of the EFTA States are based largely on the
principle of control of abuse. 7 Restrictive agreements are only con-
sidered dangerous if they have harmful effects, which is obviously
difficult to assess and can only be established after the fact.68 Fur-
thermore, the experience under the Free Trade Agreements
demonstrated the problems of securing enforcement within the
EFTA territory of the rules against cartels or state aids. 9
Uniform rules had to be rejected for constitutional reasons.
Although the EFTA States, as outlined above, will be closely asso-
ciated in the "decision-shaping" phase of Community initiatives,
the Community desired to retain autonomy in decisionmaking.
The Community could not accept joint decisionmaking with non-
Member States, which this model would have required.
Therefore, the parties adopted the third concept, in line with
the two-pillar approach described earlier. They considered this ap-
proach the most efficient way, under the circumstances, to ensure
equal conditions of competition.
See, for example, Thinam Jakob-Siebert, Competition Rules in the EC. and Switzer-
land: A Comparison of Law and Practice, 6 European Competition L Rev 255 (1990) (con-
cerning Switzerland).
Id at 256.
08 Id at 262.
69 See note 33 and accompanying text.
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4. One-stop-shop principle.
The EC model would not have been sufficient, however, with-
out safeguards to prevent the two pillars from making diverging
decisions on the same facts. Therefore, the negotiators agreed on
the one-stop-shop principle, whereby either the EC Commission or
the EFTA Surveillance Authority takes responsibility for the pro-
ceedings in each individual case, with the decisions of either body
valid throughout the EEA.
The criteria to determine which of the two pillars is responsi-
ble for a given case were simple to establish in cases where state
action is at stake, as in the field of provisions governing state mo-
nopolies, public companies, or the granting of state subsidies.
Here, each pillar will be responsible for "its own" Member States.
Negotiations were more difficult in allocating responsibility for
antitrust cases and merger control. Of course, in the field of anti-
trust cases, such as restrictive arrangements 0 and abuse of domi-
nance, 71 and the corresponding ECSC cases, there will be so-called
"pure" cases, in which the practices are implemented and take ef-
fect only in the EC territory or only in the EFTA territory. These
cases do not present problems, because obviously either one pillar
or the other will have jurisdiction. Yet, a number of cases will be
"mixed," in the sense that on the basis of the existing EC
rules7'-which will be mirrored by the EFTA-both pillars theo-
retically could claim jurisdiction.
To deal with these mixed cases, the negotiators originally fa-
vored a novel rule. In general, if the companies involved were to
achieve 33 percent or more of their combined EEA-wide turnover
in the EFTA territory, the EFTA Surveillance Authority would
have been responsible. Otherwise, the EC Commission would bear
the responsibility. In abuse of dominance cases, jurisdiction nor-
mally would have lain with the pillar in the territory in which
dominance was found to exist. The above 33 percent rule would
have applied only where there is dominance in both territories.
This concept, however, would have implied a transfer of juris-
diction from the Community to the EFTA. The negotiators origi-
nally considered this transfer acceptable, because the creation of
the joint EEA court would have given some guarantee that EEA
'0 EEC, Art 85.
7' EEC, Art 86.
" For the so-called "extraterritorial" application of EC rules, see Joint Cases 89/85,
104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 and 125/85 to 129/85, Whlstrbm Osakeyhtio ("Woodpulp"),
1988 ECR 5193.
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competition rules would be applied uniformly across EEA terri-
tory. The situation changed completely when the ECJ rejected the
notion of an EEA court. A "transfer" of jurisdiction to the EFTA
Surveillance Authority could no longer be envisaged. Therefore, a
new rule was conceived which preserves Community jurisdiction by
attributing to the EC Commission all "mixed" cases affecting trade
between EC Member States. The only exception to this rule is
that, where the effects of a given arrangement in the Community
are not appreciable,7" the EFTA Surveillance Authority will deal
with the case.
Why place so much insistence on the one-stop-shop approach
if the rules on attribution seem somewhat complex? By eliminating
both the costs of grappling with different authorities concerning
the same case and the potential for differing decisions on the same
facts, this approach presents a great advantage for the business
community. These benefits obviously accrue not only to EC or
EFTA firms, but also to U.S. and other "third country" firms that
are more and more frequently involved in transnational operations.
In the area of merger control, sharing cases was never envis-
aged. The Community pillar will retain its existing powers and will
continue to exercise merger control when the companies fulfill the
criteria of the EC Regulation on the Control of Concentrations.",
In addition, the Community will take on the supplementary task of
considering the effects not only on the common market, but also
on the EFTA territory. Thus, the EC Commission may prohibit a
merger that leads to market dominance not within the Community
but within the EFTA territory.
The EFTA pillar will exercise its own merger control, on the
basis of transposed Community rules. However, this control will be
residual, in the sense that it will only apply where the Community
has no jurisdiction under EC rules. Furthermore, EC Member
States' powers will remain untouched. Thus, EFTA merger control
will be strictly limited to EFTA territory.
This situation constitutes a clear divergence from the one-
stop-shop principle as between the pillars. The same situation,
however, exists in the relationship between Community merger
In the meaning of the Commission's Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance,
1986 OJ C231:2.
" The criteria are 5 billion ECU worldwide turnover, 250 million ECU turnover in the
Community, and less than two-thirds of the turnover in one and the same EC Member
State. Council Reg EEC/4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings,
1989 OJ L395:1; Corrigendum, 1990 OJ L257:1.
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control provisions and EC Member States' national rules. The di-
vergence can be explained by the fact that the EC merger control
rules only entered into force in September 1990 and, therefore, the
EC is only beginning the process of gathering experience. Given
this lack of experience, as well as the extremely tight dead-
lines-one month to decide whether a merger might pose
problems, plus four months within which to make a final deci-
sion-the negotiators thought that an attempt to change the ex-
isting regime might well prove premature, if not disastrous.
5. Cooperation between the pillars.
The system outlined above presupposes close cooperation be-
tween the two pillars and their respective Member States, in par-
ticular with respect to Article 85 and 86 "mixed" cases and merger
control because-the ensuing decisions will be valid throughout the
EEA. Therefore, the Agreement contains three guiding principles:
1) mutual comprehensive information and consultations;
2) administrative assistance when it becomes necessary
to conduct investigations in the territory of the pillar not
responsible for a given case; and
3) administrative assistance concerning the recovery of
fines.
6. Judicial review.
Last but not least, the negotiators wanted to ensure adequate
judicial review in the competition field. According to the solution
originally envisaged, the EC Court of First Instance and the ECJ
would have retained jurisdiction for appeals against EC Commis-
sion decisions. The EEA Court of First Instance and the EEA
Court, functionally integrated with the EC Courts, would have
judged on appeals against decisions taken by the EFTA Surveil-
lance Authority. As outlined above, this system was put into ques-
tion by the European Court of Justice. According to the new ver-
sion of the Agreement, an EFTA court will now rule on decisions
of the EFTA Surveillance Authority, whereas the EC Courts will
retain jurisdiction over Commission measures.
C. The Future of the EEA
The EEA is an adventure undertaken by the courageous. It
represents an effort to design a larger integrated market, which fits
into a general trend towards the creation of regional subsystems,
such as the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"),
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envisaged among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. Even though some
call the EEA a "European Waiting Area" for those EFTA States
who have applied or are considering application for EC member-
ship, the EEA is also an important piece of European legal archi-
tecture. I personally believe that the EEA will be a success, provid-
ing unique opportunities for companies and some 380 million
consumers, as well as preparing potential Member States for acces-
sion. The Agreement will also make life easier for non-EC or non-
EFTA companies desiring to conduct business in Europe.
Competition policy is an important factor in this context be-
cause, vigorously applied, it will eliminate private import or mar-
ket sharing cartels as well as distortions stemming from state sub-
sidies or preferential treatment of public companies, thereby
facilitating overall market access and furthering trade. There is of
course a danger of diverging development of future law and prac-
tice. One of the means proposed to mitigate this danger had been
the creation of an EEA Court composed of EC and EFTA judges.
Since this alternative has been ruled out, one must hope that coop-
eration mechanisms will help reduce the scope for disparity in the
future.
II. THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS
The so-called Europe Agreements recently concluded between
the Community and Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are an-
other piece of European architecture. These Agreements go far be-
yond the -substance of "traditional" free trade agreements and
should be considered an important step towards the political and
economic "reintegration" of those states into Europe. 5
The first formalized relations between the EC and the three
Eastern European countries are agreements on commerce and eco-
nomic and commercial cooperation. Once the developments in
Eastern Europe were underway, however, both sides desired to
strengthen the existing links by means of association agreements.
Negotiations took only eleven months before .the texts were ini-
tialled on November 22, 1991, and Bulgaria and Rumania have ex-
pressed the desire to conclude similar agreements with the
Community.In contrast to the earlier agreements which were limited to ec-
onomic and commercial cooperation, these new agreements include
' The Agreements were signed on December 16, 1991. The texts are published in 1992
JO L114 (Poland), 1992 JO L115 (Czechoslovakia), and 1992 JO L116 (Hungary).
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a number of new elements. First, they institutionalize a high-level
political dialogue. Second, they provide for establishing a free
trade area at the end of a ten-year transition period; the free trade
areas would initially favor the three Eastern European states.
Third, they contemplate economic cooperation in order to render
the economies of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia competi-
tive. Fourth, they envision cooperation in financial matters. Fifth,
they contain provisions concerning free circulation of persons and
capital, right to establishment, competition, public procurement,
and industrial and intellectual property rights, as well as provi-
sions foreseeing' the approximation of laws to Community provi-
sions. Furthermore, the Europe Agreements have been concluded
taking into account the process of European integration.76 The Eu-
rope Agreements also create new institutions. One, an Association
Council, will survey the application of the agreement and take
binding decisions in certain areas. A second, a Parliamentary Asso-
ciation Committee,, will have consultative functions.
The competition rules contained in the Europe Agreements go
much further than the rules in the "traditional" Free Trade Agree-
ments concluded between the Community and EFTA States in the
early 1970s. Not only do they cover cartels, abuses of dominant
positions, and state aids, but they also cover state monopolies and
companies to which special or exclusive rights have been granted.
The parties to the Europe Agreements have also agreed that the
competition rules will be interpreted in the same way as the corre-
sponding EC rules. Within three years, the Association Council will
adopt rules implementing the provisions on competition. Their ac-
tual application, however, will be left to the Community and the
three states.
The Europe Agreements are qualitatively different from the
EEA Agreement, in that they do not provide for immediate and
virtually full reciprocal market access. Rather, they serve to pre-
pare these newly market-oriented economies to establish them-
selves and gradually become competitive.
Competition issues played an important role in the negotia-
tions. The negotiators from both sides believed that, although
transition periods were necessary, particularly in the area of state
aids for former Eastern industries, a vigorous competition policy
76 The preamble of the agreement with Hungary states: "Having in mind that the final
objective of Hungary is to become a member of the Community and that this association, in
the view of the parties, will help to achieve this objective." The other two agreements con-
tain similar statements.
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directed against restrictive practices would increase competition.
Such competition would establish competitive market structures,
facilitate market access, and benefit consumers.
These aims must be reached gradually. Accordingly, the nego-
tiators agreed in substance on certain standards for competition
rules and incorporated into the Agreements principles pertaining
to restrictive business practices affecting trade between the Con-
tracting Parties. Meanwhile, the negotiators left the implementing
rules to be elaborated at a later stage, allowing the rules to be
adapted to the changing situation of the new democracies. One
might even envisage direct effect of those provisions in the future.
III. THE EC-U.S. AGREEMENT
The EC and U.S. authorities started from a different angle
before reaching the 1991 cooperation agreement, adopted after
only ten months of negotiations. 77 The perspectives were quite dif-
ferent from those of the EFTA dialogue because, unlike a number
of EFTA States, the U.S. is not a potential candidate for EC
membership.
Both the U.S. and the EC are committed to a similar and ac-
tive competition policy, even'though their approaches may at times
be slightly different. Rather than harmonizing both parties' ap-
proaches, the aim was to create a forum for greater transparency,
closer cooperation, and better understanding between EC and U.S.
authorities. While both sides continue to act on the basis of their
own rules, the negotiators believed that better coordination would
promote the aims of effective enforcement. For the EC side, the
agreement is the first of this kind ever to be concluded by the EC
Commission. For the United States, the agreement is likewise a
novelty: it goes further than the corresponding agreements con-
cluded with Canada and other nations.
A well-defined cooperation procedure is of crucial importance
for the Community and her trading partners, because restrictive
practices in the Community are more and more frequently interre-
lated with restrictive practices in other markets, and because im-
portant mergers rarely have effects solely within the common mar-
ket. The aim of the agreement, however, is not to provide a dispute
" See EC Commission Press Release IP (91) 848 of 23 September 1991. See also James
F. Rill, International Antitrust Policy (manuscript on file at office of the University of
Chicago Legal Forum) (cited in note 2). The agreement is presently being reviewed by the
ECJ, on the initiative of France. The text is published in 14 Competition Law of the Euro-
pean Communities 12:312 (Dec 1991).
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settlement mechanism between the EC and the U.S. in such cases,
but rather to prevent conflicts ahead of time through close cooper-
ation between the authorities. For these reasons, the agreement
contains. several traditional instruments such as notification, infor-
mation, and consultation.
However, the agreement also contains unusually detailed pro-
visions on comity, according to which the parties should take into
account their respective interests. Specifically, each party should
be reticent to apply its own competition rules "extraterritorially"
("negative comity") but may request the other to become active in
order to deal with restrictions of competition ("positive comity").
Indeed, the most innovative provision of the agreement, Article V,
recognizes that anti-competitive practices in one territory can af-
fect important interests of the other party.
Furthermore, the EC-U.S. Agreement is a political signal and
a symbol of the conviction of both parties of the necessity to tackle
in common the challenges that go hand in hand with trade liberali-
zation. The EC and the U.S. have known each other for a long time
and have cooperated in the framework of the OECD, but this
agreement takes us a decisive step farther in our mutual relations.
It might even help both parties to diminish certain psychological
barriers ("Beriihrungsangst") which may still exist to a certain ex-
tent. If that is the case, we may indeed count the EC-U.S. Agree-
ment as one of our greatest successes so far in the history of our
bilateral relations.
CONCLUSION
Outlined above are three illustrations of the Community's in-
volvement in the process of internationalization of competition law
and policy. In a certain sense, they somewhat contradict each
other: harmonization and cooperation with the EFTA countries;
harmonization and cooperation to a lesser degree with the new de-
mocracies; cooperation without harmonization with the U.S.
But this riddle is easily solved, for each agreement is adapted
to the specific needs evoked by a given situation. In markets as
closely interlinked-both economically and geographically-as the
EC and EFTA markets, governed until now by totally different
rules, parties agreed to try a uniform regime, not only with regard
to competition rules, but also with regard to a great many other
aspects. Given the existing objective differences (newly evolving
market economies, novelty of competition aspects), such a uniform
regime would not have suited the Eastern European context, which
is why the parties agreed on another, equally viable and well-
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suited, approach. Finally, despite some differences in approach,
both the EC and U.S. systems are highly sophisticated and dedi-
cated in their commitment to combat restrictive practices. I think
that it may have been precisely because of this similarity that an
agreement on cooperation was thought to be needed and adequate
to meet the parties' aims at this particular stage.
